DW
written by Julian Ryall (Tokyo)
November 19, 2018
In 2009, Japan set up a military facility in Djibouti to combat rising incidents of piracy off Northeast Africa. A decade later, the pirates have been largely defeated, but Tokyo intends to expand its Djibouti base.
When Japan set up a facility in Djibouti in 2009 with docks for warships, an airfield and the other infrastructure that an overseas military base requires to support troops on the ground, it had the very clearly defined task of supporting the international campaign against pirates operating out of Somalia.
In 2011, there were no fewer than 237 incidents involving suspected pirates. Thanks in large part to the international response, that figure fell to zero incidents in 2015 and a mere nine cases were reported in the whole of 2017.
Yet instead of declaring the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) mission accomplished, closing the Djibouti base and bringing the two Kawasaki P-1 patrol aircraft, a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer and at least 180 ground troops back to Japan, Tokyo is expected to include in its new National Defense Program Guidelines plans to upgrade the facility.
The details of the enhanced base have yet to be released, the Asahi newspaper reported, but the original 12-hectare plot alongside the Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport was last year expanded to 15 hectares.
The aim, analysts suggest, is to give Japan more of a say in international security and peacekeeping operations, but also, acting in concert with like-minded nations, serve as a check on China's increasingly expansionist agenda.
Emerging markets
Beijing opened its own military base in Djibouti in 2017 and is pushing its One Belt One Road economic initiative for Asia, the Middle East and into the emerging markets of Africa.
"I see these efforts as not just a question of expanding Japan's presence, but also an attempt to build on the broader, more multilateral quasi-alliances involving the US and Australia, as well as countries such as India that will be acting in their own national interests when it comes to China," said Jun Okumura, a political analyst at the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs.
"This is part of a broader effort among the international community to maintain the balance at a time when there are concerns over changes in the existing security balance in the Asia-Pacific region and now beyond, into the Indian Ocean," he told DW.
Japan learns from allies
The Japanese government has studied how other nations with a more global security presence – notably the US, France and the UK – operate military bases in other parts of the world. Britain, for example, took advantage of the location of its facility in Oman to expand emergency and humanitarian assistance to the people of the Philippines when Typhoon Haiyan struck in November 2013.
"No, Japan does not need a facility in Djibouti, but there are a number of advantages if they do remain there," said Garren Mulloy, an associate professor of international relations at Daito Bunkyo University and an expert on security issues.
"Firstly, if the international force deployed to put a stop to the piracy all left then the problem could very quickly come back again, so there is a need to maintain that deterrent," he told DW.
"But also, Japan's SDF has such a low profile internationally that the only place it is presently operationally engaged abroad is Djibouti and it wants to be seen to be engaged in international operations, which it has been with the anti-piracy campaign," he said.
"And the military and politicians will argue that it is always better to have a base like this and not to have to set one up – at a high cost in terms of price and political capital – when one is needed," he added. "So when any military has a base such as Djibouti, they will try to keep it to serve as a facility for future operations."
Regional hub
The base has proved important in the past, serving as a hub for transportation, logistical supply and medical aid in a time of crisis, such as when terrorists attacked a natural gas plant in Algeria in 2013, killing 10 Japanese nationals. It was also utilized when the SDF had ground forces in South Sudan as a peacekeeping force between 2012 and 2017.
And while the Japanese government has stated that it intends to have one member of the SDF in Djibouti for every 10 Chinese military personnel, Mulloy does not believe that Tokyo's decision to retain a force in the region is the start of a modern-day "Great Game" as the two countries jostle for influence – through fair means or foul – across Africa.
"African nations will be happy at international investment, whether that comes through China's One Belt One Road or Japanese trade missions and government programs. So it will be a civilian competition rather than a military one," he said.
The Diplomat
written by Tyler Headley
Tuesday December 4, 2018
China’s first overseas military base provides an interesting test case for its global ambitions.
Since its construction, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti has become an increasingly important outpost in the Horn of Africa. The base’s geostrategic location yields insights into China’s machinations for the region.
Roughly two years ago, China’s negotiations with Djibouti for the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) first overseas military base successfully concluded. On July 11, 2017, the PLAN deployed ships from the South Sea Fleet to officially open the base. The opening ceremony on August 1, 2017 was followed a month and a half later with live fire exercises.
China has avoided using overt military terminology to describe the base, as Mordechai Chaziza notes, “preferring instead to use the terms ‘support facilities’ or ‘logistical facilities.’” China still maintains that the base is primarily for nonmilitary activities; last year, the state-run news agency Xinhua wrote that “the Djibouti base has nothing to do with an arms race or military expansion, and China has no intention of turning the logistics center into a military foothold.” Analysis from Stratfor cast doubt on China’s claim, showing the military base has become heavily fortified with an underground space of 23,000 square meters.
Also, in the year since the base officially opened, it has been party to controversy including the United States. Washington alleged that China was directing powerful lasers from its base at nearby U.S. planes, a nuisance and provocation that injured two airmen. China has denied the allegations.
Much of the tension is attributable to a plethora of countries establishing bases in the Horn of Africa for its geostrategic location. Djibouti offers a prime opportunity for third party state actors to observe and defend international commerce passing through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a shipping passage renowned as the fourth most important world chokepoint for oil exports and imports. Because of the strait’s close proximity to Somalia and piracy originating from its shores, state powers have strong incentives to conduct frequent anti-piracy operations.
Because of the opportunity to run anti-piracy missions in addition to counterterrorism and myriad other activities, the United States, France, Japan, and Italy all maintain bases in Djibouti. The United States’ military base in Djibouti – Camp Lemmonier – is its only permanent base on the African continent, with more than 4,000 troops deployed.
China’s military involvement in the Horn of Africa, primarily consisting of anti-piracy missions, began a decade ago. Today, in addition to anti-piracy operations, declassified analysis from CNA posits that China’s naval facility in Djibouti will support four other key missions: intelligence collection, non-combat evacuation operations, peacekeeping operation support, and counterterrorism.
All of these objectives are in line with a nascent but escalating policy of global military engagement stretching from the South China Sea to East Africa. One of the primary mechanisms for achieving this stated goal is a strong navy, allowing China to project its power across the globe. Naval bases like the one in Djibouti will be integral to achieving this ambition. A Pentagon report from last year noted that the Djibouti base, “along with regular naval vessel visits to foreign ports, both reflects and amplifies China’s growing influence, extending the reach of its armed forces.” China refuted this claim, and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying argued the Pentagon was making “irresponsible remarks about China’s national defense development in disregard of the facts.”
The Djibouti base was constructed within the context of growing China-Djibouti economic relations, which allowed China to create their base over the United States’ objections. The Import-Export Bank of China has loaned Djibouti nearly $1 billion dollars, and sources indicate that China provides nearly 40 percent of funding for Djibouti’s large-scale infrastructure and investment projects. Some of the most notable among these are the Doraleh Multipurpose Port, the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway, and the Ethiopia-Djibouti Water Pipeline.
China’s base in Djibouti may be a harbinger of more to come in the region. As China continues its policy of Belt and Road investments in Africa, which appear to include provisions for more ports in East Africa, ensuring the security and stability of those investments will of critical importance. Counterpiracy and counterterrorism will become increasingly imperative in the years to come, especially in places like the Horn of Africa where instability meets economic opportunity. Thus, China’s base in Djibouti may not be just a military outpost but also a learning experiment for future bases on the continent.
Asia Times
written by Bertil Lintner
Wednesday November 28, 2018
Nowhere in the world are there so many military bases run by rival nations in such close proximity than in East Africa's Djibouti, where intrigue is rife and espionage is de rigueur.
Small countries with limited resources have been known to turn themselves into financial centers where dodgy banks and companies find a haven from international regulators as a means to reverse their national fortunes.
Djibouti, the third smallest country on the African mainland, has found another way to thrive: hosting military bases.
The tiny nation formerly known as French Somaliland has leveraged its strategic location at the mouth of the Red Sea and some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes running through the Suez Canal to lease its otherwise barren, rocky land to foreign powers.
Djibouti also has the seaside advantage of being comparatively serene in a region plagued by instability. Djibouti’s old colonial power France maintains a base here, as do the Americans, Italians and Japanese. Germany and Spain maintain troops at the base hosted by the French.
Then came the Chinese.
When Beijing inaugurated its first overseas military base here on August 1, 2017, Djibouti was turned fully into a modern day Casablanca, where everyone seems to be spying on one another. It may be a Francophone port city with an interior as rugged as Morocco’s, but there is no Rick’s Cafรฉ here, as famously portrayed in the 1942 movie with Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman.
But, at a more modern luxury hotel overlooking the beach in the north of Djibouti City, Western military officers and soldiers in uniform can be seen alongside Chinese businessmen and technicians as well as assorted dignitaries from Africa and Arab countries.
The Chinese base, maintained by the People’s Liberation Army Navy, is located at Doraleh west of the capital while all the other nations’ bases are situated near the international airport to the south less than ten kilometers away.
Geopolitics is a lucrative business for Djibouti. The US pays US$63 million annually in rent for its base, the French US$36 million, China US$20 million and Italy US$2.6 million. The amount Japan pays is not publicly disclosed.
There are an estimated 4,000 soldiers and Filipino workers at the American base, 180 troops at the Japanese camp and 1,450 at France’s two bases — one near the airport and a naval facility on the coast where the Germans and Spaniards are also stationed. Around 80 Italians are situated in a base near the US camp.
China’s Doraleh base is close to a new seaport and the end station of a new Chinese-built 759-kilometer railroad extending from Djibouti’s coast to the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. The standard gauge railroad was opened for commercial traffic on January 1 this year, replacing a a meter-gauge railway built during the French colonial era that is no longer used.
Passengers can use a station close to the airport while freight trains carrying containers go all the way to and from Doraleh. Nearby is the largest free trade zone in Africa, known as the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ), where hundreds of trucks can be seen waiting to pick up goods destined for Ethiopia and other countries beyond Djibouti.
The Chinese-financed, UD$3.5 billion DIFTZ opened earlier this year, covering an area of 4,800 hectares. According to an official announcement, it will focus on logistics, export processing, financial support services, manufacturing and duty-free merchandise trade.
This small and largely peaceful republic on the Horn of Africa is fast becoming China’s economic gateway to Africa. But it is the naval base that has sent jitters through the Western military community in Djibouti.
The official China Daily, which covered the opening of the base in August last year, stated at the time it could “support some 10,000 people” with the caveat that “official figures for the number of personnel to be stationed there have not been released.” The paper said the official reason for the establishment of the base was “to support the Chinese military’s escort and peacekeeping missions in Africa and West Asia.”
The Western powers that have bases there usually refer to the same reason for their presence in Djibouti, as well as to fight pirates famously active off the coast of Somalia.
But The China Daily was probably more frank than Western spokespersons as it also quoted Liu Hongwu, a professor at Zhejiang University, as saying that Djibouti “is situated at the juncture of Europe, Asia and Africa; in a sense, it is at the crossroads of the world.”
That’s more likely why China is there, to protect its economic and strategic interests in the region — and hence also better position itself for any potential conflicts between China and the West, primarily the US.
Djibouti is not America’s only base in the region. It also has an important facility in Qatar, as well as the highly secretive, multi-purpose base at Diego Garcia, a leased atoll in the British Indian Ocean Territory that is the only possession the United Kingdom keeps in the region after it withdraw from east of Suez in the 1960s.
In that sense, China’s new base in Djibouti is the first serious challenge to US military supremacy in the Indian Ocean region. And China is making incipient moves in that direction.
In July 2017, just before the official opening of the base, the Chinese warships CNS Jinggangshan and CNS Donghaidao brought in personnel and materiel to the base. The CNS Jinggangshan carried marines, engineers and military vehicles to the base while the CNS Donghaidao transported some unspecified heavy equipment.
Then, in September last year, troops stationed at the base carried out their first live-fire drills. The exercise, which involved dozens of soldiers, took place at Djibouti’s national gendarmerie training range and was meant to test their combat readiness when faced with extreme heat, humidity and salinity — all omnipresent in Djibouti as well as other parts of Africa.
To keep up the pretense that nothing untoward is underway, the combined European Union counter-piracy task force in Djibouti and China’s PLA Navy carried out a joint exercise in October.
But there is no hiding the fact that Western powers are peeved by China’s newly established presence. In March this year, Marine General Thomas Waldhauser, the top US general for Africa, told a US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee hearing that “the consequences would be significant” if China took over the port at Doraleh.
That is now happening as the Djibouti government took over the port from Dubai’s DP World in February without any official explanation and appears now to be negotiating an agreement with the state-run China Merchants Group to take its place.
DP World appealed against the decision and in August won a legal battle against Djibouti at the London Court of International Arbitration. But that is no guarantee that Chinese interests will not soon win control of the port.
CMPort, a subsidiary of the China Merchants Group which runs Djibouti’s free trade zone, said in a statement in July that “Djibouti, one of the developing countries along the Belt and Road, has similar infrastructure with Shenzhen (opposite Hong Kong) and Shekou (on the northern tip of Shenzhen), when it became the pioneer of China’s historic journey of reform and opening up.”
That effusive language shows Djibouti is a vital part of China’s desire to fortify its role as a rising world power — and Djibouti is so far serving as a willing and open client. There is even a new Confucious Center in Djibouti City which China leverages to cultivate ”people-to-people” ties.
US Waldhauser also said during the hearing in Washington that “there are some indications of (China) looking for additional facilities, specifically on the eastern coast (of Africa)…so Djibouti happens to be the first — there will be more.”
The strategically situated Horn of Africa and the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula on the other side of the Red Sea have long been coveted by competing great powers.
The French seized Djibouti in stages after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, partly to counter Britain’s presence at Aden, now in Yemen, across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the entrance to the Red Sea.
The colony became French Somaliland and, in 1967, the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas, before finally achieving independence in 1977 — the last of the directly ruled European colonies in Africa to do so.
For decades, the French Foreign Legion had a base in Djibouti known as Camp Lemonnier, which was taken over by the Americans following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington and became the only permanent US base in Africa.
It was initially meant to combat terrorist activities in the region and US drone-operations in the Middle East are known to be carried out from the base.
But Camp Lemonnier, particularly after the arrival of the Chinese at Doraleh, now has other duties to watch the Chinese. Alarm bells jangled when, in May this year, two pilots on a US cargo plane experienced eye injuries after being exposed to a laser beam.
At the time, US military officials officially accused China of using military grade lasers to distract their pilots. Although ten kilometers separate their two bases, they are watching each other closely — and suspiciously.
The laser beam incident has not been the only friction point between the various base operators. The Italians established their base here in 2009 ostensibly to fight piracy, as did the Japanese.
But when a Chinese warship docked at Djibouti last year, the website of China’s Procuatorial Daily, the official organ of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, China’s highest agency for prosecution and investigation, reported that a Japanese naval ship sent scuba gear-equipped frogmen to investigate. The Japanese did not comment on the accusation.
The nations maintaining bases in Djibouti are also widely believed to be engaged in electronic eavesdropping on one another, including surveillance of the activities of persons of interest in the country and capital city.
Indeed, the intrigues at Casablanca in the 1940s likely pale in insignificance when compared to what is happening now on this tiny speck of land on the Horn of Africa, an increasingly perilous pinnacle where spy versus spy intrigue often leaks into the public domain.
Nowhere on the planet are there so many military bases run by rival nations in such close proximity to each other. That proximity means anything can and likely will happen as the US and its allies confront a rising China in what some see as the early phases of a new Cold War.
