July 16, 2026

Autonomy in Ethical Theory

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[source: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

Autonomy is referenced or invoked in a number of key ways in ethical theory:

(i) Autonomy serves as a ground for the claims that persons have dignity and inherently deserve basic moral respect

(ii) Autonomy is said to have a value that grounds the claim that persons deserve to be told the truth

(iii) Autonomy is referenced as a fundamental principle of ethics in Kantian deontology

(iv) Autonomy is commonly viewed as a key component of human well-being (and is therefore significant for utilitarianism)

(v) Autonomy is defended as an important virtue

(vi) Autonomy is said to be necessary for moral responsibility

(vii) Autonomy is said to have a value that grounds the claim that autonomy-based demands are worthy of special respect

(i) Ever since Kant, autonomy (or the capacity for autonomy) has been referenced by some philosophers as that property of human beings by virtue of which they possess inherent dignity and therefore inherently deserve to be treated with basic moral respect. Kant’s justification for the claim that autonomy grounds the inherent dignity of persons was based on the view that it is by virtue of our autonomy that we are ends-in-ourselves. Beings that lack autonomy are, precisely because of this lack, essentially at the mercy of the determinism that characterizes the phenomenal realm: they are controlled by forces that have nothing to do with their own will. Beings that possess autonomy on the other hand, are, precisely because of this possession, free from this determination; they have the capacity for freedom through the active exercise of their autonomous wills, which allows for the legislation of universal law. Autonomous agents are not passive players in life; they are active agents, determining themselves by their own will, the authors of the laws that they follow (see Guyer 2003). As such, they are not passive means towards nature’s determined ends, but are ends-in-themselves, by virtue of which they possess inherent dignity and deserve basic moral respect.

Many have followed Kant in referencing autonomy as the ground of human dignity and as the basis of the basic moral respect owed to persons, although not all have followed Kant in the details of his account (for a recent account that moves away from Kant’s conception of noumenal freedom, see Korsgaard 1996). The most common objection leveled against this account is that it runs into problems involving exclusion. Most would argue that the mentally handicapped, for example, are owed basic moral respect, even if they do not possess (even the capacity for) autonomy. And if human dignity is indexed to the presence of autonomy, it is argued, this would entail, counter-intuitively, that those who are more autonomous have more dignity, and are more worthy of respect. It may also be argued that the capacity for autonomy is a poor ground for human dignity (and respect for persons) for other reasons–for example, because autonomy has no essential connection to morality, or because better grounds are available, or because the very project of grounding human dignity on a property of some kind is ill-conceived. Despite these worries, however, appeals to autonomy as a basis for human dignity and basic moral respect remain quite popular.

(ii) Some philosophers have argued that a proper appreciation for others as autonomous (or as possessing the capacity for autonomy) requires that one not seek to deceive them. Respect for autonomy is thus said to have an important relation to truthfulness. In Thomas Hill’s words, “Lies often reflect inadequate respect for the autonomy of the person who is deceived.” (Hill 1991) We saw above that autonomy’s value has been used to ground the basic moral respect owed to persons; and the present injunction against deception may be viewed as a specific form that autonomy-based respect for persons may take. It is easy to see why a connection between respect for autonomy and truthfulness (or what comes to the same thing–an injunction against deception) has been attractive to some philosophers, especially those in the Kantian tradition.

When we deceive others for our own purposes, we bypass their reflective abilities and make them instruments in the achievement of our own ends, and in doing this we fail to treat them as persons capable and deserving of self-determination. Proper respect for persons as autonomous thus requires a commitment to truthfulness. It has been argued, however, that one may respect and value the autonomy of another while deceiving them at the same time (Buss 2005). One may, for example, use forms of deception so that another’s capacity for autonomy may flourish. The basic idea here is that one may still reason for oneself despite being deliberately influenced by the deceptive behavior of others. As Sarah Buss writes, “To put it somewhat crudely, whether an instance of practical reasoning is self-determined is a matter of whether it is really the agent herself who is doing the reasoning. And this would seem to depend on whether she determines her response to the considerations that figure in her reasoning–not on how the considerations to which she responds relate to reality, nor on how she came to be aware of these considerations.”

It may be argued, however, that the conception of autonomy underlying this claim is too thin to be acceptable, and that a better conception would contain the resources necessary to judge self-determining reasoning influenced by the deliberate deception of another as nonautonomous. In this vein, some have argued that a person is autonomous in relation to a given desire or choice only if that person would not feel alienated from the causal process that gave rise to that desire or choice (Christman 2007). On the assumption that persons would feel alienated from deceptive desire- or choice-forming processes, the associated desires or choices would not count as autonomous. In response to this, however, it may be argued that autonomous agents may not feel alienated from all (or many) deceptive forms of influence upon the formation of their desires and choices, depending on the circumstances (Buss 2005). If this were the case, then a commitment to the value of autonomy may not be inconsistent with certain forms of deception or manipulation. Yet, given the traditional opposition between autonomous self-determination and agential determination rooted in deceit and manipulation, it is to be expected that resistance to the notion that they are not incompatible will continue.

(iii) Autonomy plays a key role in Kant’s deontological ethics. We have already seen this in the way in which Kant grounds human dignity in autonomy. But autonomy plays a further (and closely related) normative role for Kant. It is often said that Kant held that the Categorical Imperative can be expressed in three closely related formulas: the Formula of Universal Law, the Formula of Humanity, and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. It has also been claimed, however, that Kant defended a fourth formula, which may be called the Formula of Autonomy. Although Kant did not state this formula explicitly, it has been argued that it can be plausibly derived from his description of the Categorical Imperative as “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law.” The corresponding Formula of Autonomy could then be expressed as an imperative in this way: act so that the maxims you will could be the legislation of universal law. According to this formula, we should act according to principles that express the autonomy of the will. This formulation is important, firstly because it suggests that Kant conceived autonomy as a normative principle (and not merely as a condition of the will that makes morality possible), and secondly because it further reinforces Kant’s claim that humans, as autonomous law-givers, are the source of the universal law that guarantees their freedom and hence marks them out as possessing inherent dignity (see Reath 2006).

(iv) Autonomy is commonly held to be a core component of well-being. This view goes back at least to Mill’s On Liberty, and has been accepted by many contemporary philosophers as well (see for example Griffin 1986 and Sumner 1996). In this connection, some argue that autonomy is an intrinsic part of well-being, and others argue that being autonomous reliably leads to well-being (and hence has instrumental prudential value). Although thus far, the normative importance of autonomy has been described as being associated primarily with deontology, the claim that autonomy is a core component of well-being shows that it can play a key role in consequentialist moral theories as well. Indeed, as will be discussed in greater detail below (section 4), although most defenses of the principle of respect for autonomy are deontological in nature, it is also possible to defend the principle on consequentialist grounds. From this point of view, it can be argued that autonomy deserves respect because respecting autonomy is reliably conducive to well-being.

(v) Autonomy has been claimed to be an important virtue to possess. It is not difficult to see why this is the case. The autonomous person is a person possessing a constellation of widely desirable qualities such as self-control, self-knowledge, rationality and reflective maturity. To be autonomous is to be self-governing; to be free from domination by foreign influences over one’s character and values; to ‘be one’s own person’. Following from this, it is claimed by some that autonomy is a great virtue to possess - one which constitutes an important part of human flourishing. It may be objected, however, that an excessive concern with autonomy can be at odds with virtue, especially if robust autonomy entails an inability to exhibit loyalty or fidelity to projects, other persons or communities. Recent work on personal autonomy, however, has tended to support the notion that autonomy possession is not incompatible with these and similar forms of attachment (Friedman 2003).

(vi) Autonomy has been seen by some thinkers as having implications for a correct account of moral responsibility. Some accounts hold that autonomy is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. The basic defense of this claim is that it makes little sense to say that someone is morally responsible for her actions if she is not the author of those actions; and since one is the author of one’s actions only if one is autonomous, autonomy possession is necessary for moral responsibility. According to this account, the class of actions that are autonomous and the class of actions for which we are morally responsible are identical, or at least almost so (see Fischer and Ravizza 1998). Other accounts hold that although persons are certainly morally responsible for their autonomous actions, they are also morally responsible for a wider range of actions as well. An account of this sort is often made by those who hold a more demanding conception of autonomy; and defenders of this account argue that we still want to hold persons morally responsible for the many actions that do not satisfy robust autonomy conditions on the one hand, but are not constituted of sheer heteronomy (brainwashing, psychosis, coercion, and so forth) on the other (see Arpaly 2005).

(vi) Many thinkers believe that autonomous claims or demands are worthy of special normative uptake–special respect–by virtue of the fact that they are autonomous. It is important to see how this claim is different from the first point given above (viz., that autonomy is said to ground basic moral respect for persons). The former claim is that the fact that persons are autonomous (or have the capacity for autonomy) is what grounds their special dignity, by virtue of which they are owed basic moral respect. Now, it is possible to owe someone basic moral respect, but not to owe special respect to a subset of their choices. Imagine that someone is brainwashed, for example. Many would argue that although we owe that person basic moral respect (for example, we are obligated, say, not to harm them or to lie to them), we do not owe special respect to that person’s demands (say, to promote or not interfere with those demands). The current claim holds, however, that the fact that a person’s choices are autonomous generates special demands of respect for those choices over and above the basic respect owed to the chooser (whether this be conceived as being by virtue of their capacity for autonomy or not). This principle–that autonomous choice deserves special respect–may be justified in either a deontological or consequentialist manner. Because of the considerable importance of this principle, however, it deserves a more detailed discussion, which is provided in section 4 below.

History of the Concept of Autonomy, Part 2

[source: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

Autonomy: Normative

Autonomy is variously rendered as self-law, self-government, self-rule, or self-determination. The concept first came into prominence in ancient Greece (from the Greek auto-nomos), where it characterized city states that were self governing. Only later–during the European Enlightenment–did autonomy come to be widely understood as a property of persons. Today the concept is used in both senses, although most contemporary philosophers deal with autonomy primarily as a property of persons. This orientation will be maintained here.

Most people would agree that autonomy is normatively important. This agreement is reflected both in the presence of broad assent to the principle that autonomy deserves respect, and in the popular practice of arguing for the institution (or continuation, or discontinuation) of public policy based in some way on the value of self-determination. Many also believe that developing and cultivating autonomy is an important–indeed, on some accounts, an indispensable–part of living a good life. But although the claim that autonomy is normatively significant in some way is intuitively compelling, it is not obvious why autonomy has this significance, or what weight autonomy-based considerations should be given in relation to competing normative considerations. In order to answer these questions with sufficient rigor, it is necessary to have a more detailed understanding of what autonomy is.

This article will be devoted to canvassing the leading work done by philosophers on these two issues, beginning with the question of the nature of autonomy, and then moving to the question of the normative significance of autonomy. It will be seen that autonomy has been understood in several different ways, that it has been claimed to have normative significance of various kinds, and that it has been employed in a wide range of philosophical issues. Special attention will be paid to the question of justification of the principle of respect for autonomous choice.

1. History of the Concept of Autonomy

The concept of autonomy first came into prominence in ancient Greece, where it characterized self-governing city-states. Barring one exception (mentioned below), autonomy was not explicitly predicated of persons, although there is reason to hold that many philosophers of that time had something similar in mind when they wrote of persons being guided or ruled by reason. Plato and Aristotle, for example–as well as many of the Stoics–surely would have agreed that a person ruled by reason is a properly self-governing or self-ruling person. What one does not find, however, are ancient philosophers speaking of the ideal of autonomy as that of living according to one’s unique individuality. The one exception to this appears to be found in the thinker and orator Dio of Prusa (ca. 50–ca. 120), who, in his 80th Discourse, clearly seems to predicate autonomy of individual persons in roughly the sense in which it has come to be understood in our own day (see Cooper 2003).

Medieval philosophers made no use of the concept of autonomy that is worthy of note, although once again, many medieval philosophers would have doubtless agreed that those who live in accordance with right reason and the will of God are properly self-governing. The concept of autonomy wouldn’t be circulated in learned circles again until the Renaissance and early modern times, when it was employed both in the traditional political sense, and in an ecclesiastical sense, to refer to churches that were–or at least claimed to be –independent of the authority of the Roman Catholic Pope (see Pohlmann 1971).

The concept of autonomy came into philosophical prominence for the first time with the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s work on autonomy, however, was strongly influenced by the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, so a brief word on Rousseau is in order. Although Rousseau did not use the term ‘autonomy’ in his writings, his conception of moral freedom–defined as “obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself”– has a clear relation to Kant’s understanding of autonomy (as will be shown below). Moreover, Rousseau wrote of moral freedom as a property of persons, thus presaging Kant’s predication of autonomy of persons. The connections between Rousseau and Kant cannot be taken too far, however; for Rousseau was primarily concerned with the question of how moral freedom can be achieved and sustained by individuals within society given the presence of relations of social dependency and the possibility of domination, whereas Kant was primarily concerned with the place of autonomy in accounts of the subjective conditions requisite for, and the nature of, morality. Because of the connections Kant drew between autonomy and morality, Kant’s conception of autonomy is sometimes referred to as ‘moral autonomy’.

In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill contributed to the discussion on the normative significance of autonomy in his work On Liberty. Although Mill did not use the term ‘autonomy’ in this work, he is widely understood as having had self-determination in mind. Mill’s work continues to have considerable influence on discussions on the normative significance of autonomy in relation to paternalism of various kinds.

A tremendous amount of research on autonomy has taken place in the last several decades in both the analytic and continental traditions. Continental philosophers speak more often of authenticity than of autonomy, but there are clear connections between the two, insofar as the ‘self’ in ‘self-determination’ is plausibly understood as the authentic self. Philosophers working in the analytic tradition have gone into great detail attempting to discern necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of autonomy, as well as to uncover the ground and implications of its normative significance.

2. Conceptions of Autonomy

There are several different conceptions of autonomy, all of which are loosely based upon the core notions of self-government or self-determination, but which differ considerably in the details.

a. Moral Autonomy

As mentioned, moral autonomy is associated with the work of Kant, and is also referred to as ‘autonomy of the will’ or ‘Kantian autonomy.’ This form of autonomy consists in the capacity of the will of a rational being to be a law to itself, independently of the influence of any property of objects of volition. More specifically, an autonomous will is said to be free in both a negative and a positive sense. The will is negatively free in that it operates entirely independently of alien influences, including all contingent empirical determinations associated with appetite, desire-satisfaction, or happiness. The will is positively free in that it can act in accordance with its own law. Kant’s notion of autonomy of the will thus involves, as Andrews Reath has written, “not only a capacity for choice that is motivationally independent, but a lawgiving capacity that is independent of determination by external influence and is guided by its own internal principle–in other words, by a principle that is constitutive of lawgiving” (Reath 2006). Now, because the lawgiving of the autonomous will contains no content given by contingent empirical influences, this lawgiving must be universal; and because these laws are the product of practical reason, they are necessary. Insofar, then, as Kant understood moral laws as universal and necessary practical laws, it can be seen why Kant posited an essential connection between the possession of autonomy and morality: the products of the autonomous will are universal and necessary practical laws–that is, moral laws. It is thus by virtue of our autonomy that we are capable of morality, and we are moral to the extent that we are autonomous. It is for this reason that Kant’s conception of autonomy is described as moral autonomy. Moral autonomy refers to the capacity of rational agents to impose upon themselves–to legislate for themselves–the moral law.

Furthermore, the capacity for autonomy, according to Kant, is “the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational nature;” and in accordance with this rational nature, is an end in itself. Furthermore, it “restricts freedom of action, and is an object of respect”. Many thinkers have followed Kant in grounding the dignity of persons (and respect for persons generally) in our capacity for autonomy (although it should be noted that not all of these thinkers have accepted Kant’s conception of autonomy). More will be said on this below.

Moral autonomy is said to be a bivalent property possessed by all rational beings by virtue of their rationality–although according to Kant, it is certainly possible not to live in accordance with its deliverances in practice (for more on Kant’s conception of autonomy, see Hill 1989, Guyer 2003, and Reath 2006).

One of the most common objections to this conception of autonomy is that such a robust form of independence from contingent empirical influences is not possible. Kant defended the possibility of such robust independence by arguing that human agents inhabit two realms at once: the phenomenal realm of experience, in relation to which we are determined; and a noumenal or transcendental realm of the intellect, in relation to which we are free. Given the further claim that our noumenal self can exercise efficient causality in the phenomenal realm, Kant held that our autonomy is in large part constituted by our noumenal freedom. The postulation of such a form of freedom may be criticized as metaphysically extravagant, however; and if such freedom is not possible, then neither is moral autonomy in Kant’s strict sense. Some thinkers have argued that Kant’s theorization on the noumenal realm was not meant to have metaphysical significance. Thomas Hill has argued, for example, that Kant may have been merely elaborating on the practical conditions in which we must understand ourselves insofar as we conceive ourselves as free. Objectors have insisted, however, that Kant intended to assert the more robust form of metaphysical freedom. Indeed, it could be pressed, he must have; for without this sense of freedom being operative, actual autonomy–and hence morality, by Kant’s lights–would not be possible.

b. Existentialist Autonomy

Existentialist autonomy is an extreme form of autonomy associated principally with the writings of Jean Paul Sartre. It refers to the complete freedom of subjects to determine their natures and guiding principles independently of any forms of social, anthropological or moral determination. To possess existentialist autonomy is thus to be able to choose one’s nature without constraint from any principles not of one’s own choosing. Sartre held this radical freedom to be entailed by the truth of atheism. According to Sartre, God’s nonexistence entails two key conclusions: firstly, humans cannot have a predetermined nature; and secondly, there cannot exist a realm of values possessing independent validity. Taken together, this entails that human beings are radically free: “For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism–man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behavior. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse.” Fettered neither by a predetermined nature nor by an independently existing order of values, “[m]an is nothing else but what he makes of himself” (Sartre 1946).

Like moral autonomy, existentialist autonomy is a bivalent property which all human persons are said to possess (although possibly without being aware of this). Unlike moral autonomy, however, existentialist autonomy has no necessary connections to morality or to rationality as traditionally conceived.

The primary objection to existentialist autonomy is that it is too radical to be plausible. Even if God does not exist, it is argued, it does not follow that humans lack a nature that determines–at least to some extent–their choices, tendencies, proclivities, and guiding principles. A thoroughly naturalistic conception of human nature, informed by an understanding of the evolutionary forces operative in human psychology, seems to militate against the notion that humans are as unbounded as existentialist autonomy suggests we are. At the very least, it could be argued that empirical evidence does not speak in favor of the existence of existentialist autonomy in any robust form.

History of the Concept of Autonomy: Part 1.

[source: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

Autonomy is an individual’s capacity for self-determination or self-governance. Beyond that, it is a much-contested concept that comes up in a number of different arenas. For example, there is the folk concept of autonomy, which usually operates as an inchoate desire for freedom in some area of one’s life, and which may or may not be connected with the agent’s idea of the moral good. This folk concept of autonomy blurs the distinctions that philosophers draw among personal autonomy, moral autonomy, and political autonomy. Moral autonomy, usually traced back to Kant, is the capacity to deliberate and to give oneself the moral law, rather than merely heeding the injunctions of others. Personal autonomy is the capacity to decide for oneself and pursue a course of action in one’s life, often regardless of any particular moral content. Political autonomy is the property of having one’s decisions respected, honored, and heeded within a political context.

Another distinction that can be made is between autonomy as a bare capacity to make decisions and of autonomy as an ideal. When autonomy functions as an ideal, agents who do not meet certain criteria in having reached a decision are deemed non-autonomous with respect to that decision. This can function both locally, in terms of particular actions, and globally, in terms of agents as a whole. For instance, children, agents with cognitive disabilities of a certain kind, or members of oppressed groups have been deemed non-autonomous because of their inability to fulfill certain criteria of autonomous agency, due to individual or social constraints.

There is debate over whether autonomy needs to be representative of a kind of “authentic” or “true” self. This debate is often connected to whether the autonomy theorist believes that an “authentic” or “true” self exists. In fact, conceptions of autonomy are often connected to conceptions of the nature of the self and its constitution. Theorists who hold a socially constituted view of the self will have a different idea of autonomy (sometimes even denying its existence altogether) than theorists who think that there can be some sort of core “true” self, or that selves as agents can be considered in abstraction from relational and social commitments and contexts.

Finally, autonomy has been criticized as being a bad ideal, for promoting a pernicious model of human individuality that overlooks the importance of social relationships and dependency. Responses to these criticisms have come in various forms, but for the most part philosophers of autonomy have striven to express the compatibility of the social aspects of human action within their conceptions of self-determination, arguing that there need not necessarily be an antagonism between social and relational ties, and our ability to decide our own course of action.

This article will focus primarily on autonomy at the level of the individual and the work being done on personal autonomy, but will also address the connection of autonomy to issues in bioethics and political theory.

1. The History of Autonomy

a. Before Kant

The roots of autonomy as self-determination can be found in ancient Greek philosophy, in the idea of self-mastery. For both Plato and Aristotle, the most essentially human part of the soul is the rational part, illustrated by Plato’s representation of this part as a human, rather than a lion or many-headed beast, in his description of the tripartite soul in the Republic. A just soul, for Plato, is one in which this rational human part governs over the two others. Aristotle identifies the rational part of the soul as most truly a person’s own in the Nicomachean Ethics (1166a17-19).

Plato and Aristotle also both associate the ideal for humanity with self-sufficiency and a lack of dependency on others. For Aristotle, self-sufficiency, or autarkeia, is an essential ingredient of happiness, and involves a lack of dependence upon external conditions for happiness. The best human will be one who is ruled by reason, and is not dependent upon others for his or her happiness.

This ideal continues through Stoic philosophy and can be seen in the early modern philosophy of Spinoza. The concept of autonomy itself continued to develop in the modern period with the decrease of religious authority and the increase of political liberty and emphasis on individual reason. Rousseau’s idea of moral liberty, as mastery over oneself, is connected with civil liberty and the ability to participate in legislation.

b. Kant

Kant further developed the idea of moral autonomy as having authority over one’s actions. Rather than letting the principles by which we make decisions be determined by our political leaders, pastors, or society, Kant called upon the will to determine its guiding principles for itself, thus connecting the idea of self-government to morality; instead of being obedient to an externally imposed law or religious precept, one should be obedient to one’s own self-imposed law. The former he called heteronomy; the latter autonomy. In his “What is Enlightenment” essay, he described enlightenment as “the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority” and called on his readers to have the courage to use their own understanding “without direction from another” (Kant 1996, 17). This description is close to what we might acknowledge today as personal autonomy, but Kant’s account is firmly located within his moral philosophy.

In acting we are guided by maxims, which are the subjective principles by which we might personally choose to abide. If these maxims can be deemed universal, such that they would be assented to and willed by any rational being, and thus not rooted in any individual’s particular contingent experience, then they may gain the status of objective laws of morality. Each moral agent, then, is to be seen as a lawgiver in a community where others are also lawgivers in their own right, and hence are to be respected as ends in themselves; Kant calls this community the kingdom of ends.

While the will is supposed to be autonomous, for Kant, it is also not supposed to be arbitrary or particularistic in its determinations. He sees our inclinations and emotional responses as external to the process of the will’s self-legislation; consequently, letting them determine our actions is heteronomous rather than autonomous. Feelings, emotions, habits, and other non-intellectual factors are excluded from autonomous decision-making. Any circumstances that particularize us are also excluded from autonomous decision-making.

The reason for Kant’s exclusion of feelings, inclinations, and other particular aspects of our lives from the structure of autonomy is rooted in his metaphysical account of the human being, which radically separates the phenomenal human self from the noumenal human self. All empirical aspects of our selfhood — all aspects of our experience — are part of the phenomenal self, and subject to the deterministic laws of natural causality. Our freedom, on the other hand, cannot be perceived or understood; rather we must posit the freedom of the will as the basis for our ability to act morally.

Contemporary Kantians within moral theory do not adhere to Kant’s metaphysics, but seek to understand how something like Kant’s conception of autonomy can still stand today. Thomas Hill suggests, for example, that the separation of our free will from our empirical selfhood be taken less as a metaphysical idea but as a normative claim about what ought to count as reasons for acting (Hill 1989, 96-97)

There are significant differences between Kant’s conception of moral autonomy and the conceptions of personal autonomy developed within the last thirty years, which attempt to articulate how social and cultural influences can be compatible with autonomous decision-making. Further, the majority of contemporary theories of personal autonomy are content-neutral accounts of autonomy which are unconcerned with whether or not a person is acting according to moral laws; they focus more on determining whether or not a person is acting for his or her own reasons than on putting any restrictions on autonomous action.

c. The Development of Individualism in Autonomy

Between Kant’s description of moral autonomy and the recent scholarship on personal autonomy, however, there was a process of individualizing the idea of autonomy. The Romantics, reacting against the emphasis on the universality of reason put forth by the Enlightenment, of which Kant’s philosophy was a part, prized particularity and individuality. They highlighted the role of the passions and emotions over reason, and the importance of developing one's own unique self. John Stuart Mill also praised and defended the development and cultivation of individuality as worthwhile in itself, writing that “A person whose desires and impulses are his own – are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture – is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own has no character, no more than a steam engine has a character” (Mill 1956, 73).

The Romantic conception of individuality was then echoed within the conception of authenticity that runs through phenomenological and existential philosophy. Heidegger posits an inner call of conscience summoning us away from ‘das Man’: in order to be authentic, we need to heed this inner call and break away from inauthentically following the crowd. This conception of authenticity became intertwined with the idea of autonomy: both involve a call to think for oneself and contain a streak of individualism (see Hinchman 1996).

Unlike the universalism espoused by Kantian autonomy, however, authenticity, like the Romantic view, involves a call to be one’s own person, not merely to think for oneself. For Kant, thinking for oneself would, if undertaken properly, lead to universalizing one’s maxims; for both the Romantics and the Existentialists, as well as for Mill, there is no such expectation. This division is still present in the contrast between conceiving of autonomy as a key feature of moral motivation, and autonomy as self-expression and development of individual practical identity.

The emphasis on autonomy within this strain of philosophy was criticized by Emmanuel Lévinas, who sees autonomy as part of our selfish and close-minded desire to strive toward our own fulfillment and self-gratification rather than being open to the disruptive call of the other’s needs (Lévinas 1969). He argues for the value of heteronomy over autonomy. For Lévinas, in heteronomy, the transcendent face of the other calls the ego into question, and the self realizes its unchosen responsibility and obligation to the other. The self is hence not self-legislating, but is determined by the call of the other. This criticism of the basic structure of autonomy has been taken up within continental ethics, which attempts to determine how or whether a practical, normative ethics could be developed within this framework (see for example Critchley 2007).

d. Autonomy and Psychological Development

The connection between autonomy and the ideal of developing one’s own individual self was adopted within the humanistic psychologies of Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, who saw the goal of human development as “self-actualization” and “becoming a person,” respectively. For Maslow and Rogers, the most developed person is the most autonomous, and autonomy is explicitly associated with not being dependent on others.

More recently Lawrence Kohlberg developed an account of moral psychological development, in which more developed agents display a greater amount of moral autonomy and independence in their judgments. The highest level bears a great resemblance to the Kantian moral ideal, in its reference to adopting universal values and standards as one’s own.

Kohlberg’s work was criticized by Carol Gilligan, who argued that this pattern reflected male development, but not female. Instead of taking “steps toward autonomy and independence,” in which “separation itself becomes the model and the measure of growth,” “for women, identity has as much to do with intimacy as with separation” (Gilligan 1982, 98). The trajectory is thus less about individualization and independence than toward ultimately balancing and harmonizing an agent’s interests with those of others.

Gilligan does not entirely repudiate autonomy itself as a value, but she also does not suggest how it can be distinguished from the ideals of independence and separation from others. Her critiques have been widely influential and have played a major role in provoking work on feminist ethics and, despite her criticism of the ideal of autonomy, conceptions of “relational autonomy.”

The contemporary literature on personal autonomy within philosophy tends to avoid these psychological ideas of individual development and self-actualization. For the most part, it adopts a content-neutral approach that rejects any particular developmental criteria for autonomous action, and is more concerned with articulating the structure by which particular actions can be deemed autonomous (or, conversely, the structure by which an agent can be deemed autonomous with respect to particular actions).

2. Personal Autonomy

The contemporary discussion of personal autonomy can primarily be distinguished from Kantian moral autonomy through its commitment to metaphysical neutrality. Related to this is the adherence to at least a procedural individualism: within contemporary personal autonomy accounts, an action is not judged to be autonomous because of its rootedness in universal principles, but based on features of the action and decision-making process purely internal and particular to the individual agent.

The main distinction within personal autonomy is that between content-neutral accounts, which do not specify any particular values or principles that must be endorsed by the autonomous agent, and substantive accounts which specify some particular value or values that must be included within autonomous decision-making.
 
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12 Laughter Quotes To Get You Revved Up For The Week! Laughter And A Good Sense Of Humor Helps Us To Alleviate Any Angst And Remain Balanced In Life. ❤

NOTE TO SELF:

12 Laughter Quotes To Get You Ready For The Week!
By Various Extra-Ordinary People
  1. A sense of humor... is needed armor. Joy in one's heart and some laughter on one's lips is a sign that the person down deep has a pretty good grasp of life. ~ by Hugh Sidey

  2. A well-developed sense of humor is the pole that adds balance to your steps as you walk the tightrope of life. ~ by William Arthur Ward

  3. Humor is the great thing, the saving thing. The minute it crops up, all our irritation and resentments slip away, and a sunny spirit takes their place. ~ by Mark Twain

  4. All you need in the world is love and laughter. That's all anybody needs. To have love in one hand and laughter in the other. ~ by August Wilson

  5. At the height of laughter, the universe is flung into a kaleidoscope of new possibilities. ~ by Jean Houston

  6. Back of every mistaken venture and defeat is the laughter of wisdom, if you listen. ~ by Carl Sandburg

  7. Hearty laughter is a good way to jog internally without having to go outdoors. ~ by Norman Cousins

  8. I always knew looking back on my tears would bring me laughter, but I never knew looking back on my laughter would make me cry. ~ by Cat Stevens

  9. I think laughter may be a form of courage. As humans we sometimes stand tall and look into the sun and laugh, and I think we are never more brave than when we do that. ~ by Linda Ellerbee

  10. If love is the treasure, laughter is the key. ~ by Yakov Smirnoff

  11. In the sweetness of friendship let there be laughter, and sharing of pleasures. For in the dew of little things the heart finds its morning and is refreshed. ~ by Kahlil Gibran

  12. Laughter is an instant vacation. ~ by Milton Berle
BONUS

Everybody laughs the same in every language because laughter is a universal connection. ~ by Yakov Smirnoff

BONUS BONUS
Gratitude helps you to grow and expand; gratitude brings joy and laughter into your life and into the lives of all those around you. ~ by Eileen Caddy

HAPPY Thursday Everybody! :)

LOL! ;D

July 14, 2026

USA: 15yo Daughter And 16yo Boyfriend Hunted 7 Family Members At 3 East St Louis, Ill Locations, Murdered 5: Grandma, Mom, Brother, Sister, Aunt And Injured 2 Because They Rejected Boyfriend.

KSDK News published July 14, 2026: Survivor's husband says teenage couple posted 'hit list' prior to killing 5 family members. The husband of a survivor speaks as a teenage couple charged wit executing five family members and killing two others.
CBS Chicago published July 12, 2026: East St. Louis mass shooting leaves 5 family members dead, 2 others hurt. Illinois state police say the two suspected shooters are 15 and 16 years old and are in custody.
KSDK News published July 13, 2026: Family mourns 5 members slain in East St. Louis; teen relatives arrested. As loved ones mourn five relatives killed in an East St. Louis shooting, two teenage family members face possible charges.
********
KSDK.com
written/reported by Melanie Johnson
Tuesday July 14, 2026

EAST ST. LOUIS, Ill. — Loved ones detail a violent killing spree across East St. Louis at the hands of their 15- year-old relative and her boyfriend.

On Tuesday, Illinois state prosecutors announced charges against 16-year-old, Ja’Ymier Davis and the arrest of his teen girlfriend in the murders of 5 of her family members. Two others were shot and are fighting for their lives.

"It’s all because y'all wanted to be together, so they wanted to eliminate everybody that had a problem with the situation,” Lamarion Smiley, a relative of the victims, told 5 On Your Side.

The teenager’s grandmother, 74-year-old Patricia May; aunt, 49-year-old Cherie May; and cousin, 20-year-old Devin May, were all shot and killed. The pair also accused of executing her own siblings, Quentin Thompson, 21, and Shania Thompson, 25.

Smiley’s wife, Santosha Scott, survived the shooting along with Tiffany Thompson, the teen girl’s mother. Scott was shot in the back and Thompson in the neck.

“There was a list on Instagram that her and the boyfriend made. So we were aware, we just didn't know when,” Smiley said.

Ja’ymier Davis, 16, has been charged as an adult with 12 felony counts, including first-degree murder, attempted murder, and a shocking count of dismembering a human body. Prosecutors are also moving to transfer his 15-year-old girlfriend's case to adult court, where she faces first-degree murder charges.

St. Clair County prosecutors and grieving relatives say the teen couple systematically executed family members who tried to keep them apart.

“She ran away with this boy numerous times. Stayed in vacant houses with this boy, and every time we found her and brought her back home, we let her know, like, 'You're 15, you don't know what love truly is yet,'" Smiley said.

The deadly rampage spanned three separate locations in East St. Louis on Sunday, culminating in a final ambush at Jones Park.

Before the final shooting, family members had retrieved the runaway 15-year-old and Davis from a transit bus. Unbeknownst to the family, the teens had already allegedly murdered three relatives at homes on 39th and Summit and the Samuel Gompers housing complex.

“Her daughter took the keys from her (mother's) purse, unlocked the lockbox and took the firearm. The police were notified as soon as they found out that the firearm was taken,” Smiley said.

Charges have also been filed against the teens for the stolen gun.

According to Smiley, as his wife, Santasha Scott, went to park the SUV, the teens opened fire inside the vehicle.

"They took them to Jones Park and they fired off in the vehicle. Hitting my wife four times. Killing Quentin and Shania Thompson, and shooting my auntie in the face," Smiley recalled.

Smiley said the 15-year-old girl then stood over his wounded wife, attempting to pull the trigger again, but the gun was out of bullets.

“She walked over to her own mother, trying to kill her, and the boy said, ‘We're gonna let you live, we're gonna let y'all live today,” before taking the family’s car and driving off.

Aggravated vehicular hijacking among the 12 felony charges.

Under Illinois law, Davis was automatically charged as an adult because of his age and the severity of the charges. St. Clair County State’s Attorney’s spokesperson Chris Allen confirmed that a juvenile delinquency petition has been filed against the 15-year-old girl, and the state will aggressively petition the court to try her as an adult.

Meanwhile, state officials are stepping in to support the devastated family. 5 On Your Side has confirmed that several Illinois lawmakers are actively working to secure emergency state funding under the Crime Victims Compensation Act to fully cover the massive medical and funeral expenses.

As the community processes this tragedy, Smiley urged parents to stay highly vigilant.

"Pay attention to your children. Check these phones," Smiley said. "This probably could have been prevented had we known this sooner. Mental health is a serious thing."

The family has set up fundraisers to assist with funeral and medical costs:


USA: 16yo Female Shot In The Head While 3 Friends Were Visiting Her Misouri Home. One Teen Charged As An Adult For Involuntary Manslaughter. All 3 Charged With Abandonment Of A Corpse.

FOX 2 St. Louis published July 14, 2026: Juveniles charged in Jefferson County 16-year-old’s death. Three juveniles have been charged, though one remains in custody, after a 16-year-old girl was found dead in her Jefferson County home this weekend.
KSDK News published July 14, 2026: 'My baby's gone': 3 teens charged after teen girl shot to death, abandoned body found by mother. A woman's world changed in an instant after she came home to find her 16-year-old daughter shot to death.
KSDK News published July 13, 2026: Mother comes home to find her teenage daughter shot to death; three minors face charges. A quiet neighborhood in Jefferson County is grappling with grief after a 16-year-old girl was found shot to death inside her home.

******* 
 KCTV5 News, Missouri local
written by Staff 
Tuesday July 14, 2026

JEFFERSON COUNTY, Mo. — A 16-year-old girl was found shot to death in a Missouri home over the weekend.

Gabbriana Boyster’s body was found Saturday afternoon in a home near Hillsboro, about 45 minutes southwest of St. Louis.

Investigators said she was shot in the head.

Jefferson County Sheriff David Marshak said investigators believe the shooting happened Friday evening and the victim’s body was abandoned for hours.

The Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office said Tuesday that three juvenile suspects had been charged. Their names were not released.

One was charged with involuntary manslaughter, unlawful use of a weapon-death, armed criminal action and abandonment of a corpse. The juvenile is still in custody.

The other two juveniles were released from custody after each was charged with abandonment of a corpse.

The Hillsboro School District said grief counseling services will be available for students and families.
“Our hearts are with the student’s family, friends, and everyone impacted by this unimaginable loss,” Hillsboro School District Superintendent Dr. Jon Isaacson said. “While words cannot take away the pain of this tragedy, we want our students, staff, and families to know they are not alone. We are committed to providing support and care for everyone who is grieving during this difficult time.”

No other information has been released.

USA: Remains Of 28yo Indigenous Mom Found In A Scottsdale, AZ Canal 10 Days After Reported Missing. Turquoise Alert Was Not Issued. No Arrests Made. No Autopsy Update From Maricopa County.

UPDATE 7/16/26 at 9:59am: I looked up how long it takes for Maricopa County to conduct an autopsy and as you can see in the screenshot below, it takes 60 to 90 days to complete and release the official Maricopa final autopsy report. Well, her remains were found in March and it is now July. It is 4 months later, 110 days later and Maricopa County has not released an offical final autopsy report. (emphasis mine)
I took this facebook screenshot directly from Scottsdale Police dept dated March 28, 2026. They clearly state in this post that and I quote, 
"The medical examiner is still determining the official cause of death. We’re being told the full report, including toxicology, won’t be ready for several more weeks."
Again, it has now been 110 days since the Scottsdale Police dept made that announcement on Facebook and the family and community have not received any updates regarding the cause of her death and who was involved in her death. (emphasis mine)

***ORIGINAL POST***
FOX 10 Phoenix published March 29, 2026: Missing woman found dead in Arizona canal. Advocates are questioning why a Turquoise Alert was not issued for a missing 28-year-old woman who was found dead in a Scottsdale canal on Saturday morning.
ABC15 Arizona published April 1, 2026: Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community grieves Passion Schurz at candlelight vigil. About 200 members of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community stood in unity to grieve Passion Schurz at a candlelight vigil on Wednesday night.
Arizona’s Family (3TV / CBS 5) published April 11, 2026: Motorcyclists escort body of Indigenous woman home in Arizona. Passion Schurz, 28, was reported missing in March after she was last seen near her community. Her body was found days later in a Scottsdale canal.

*********
Fox10 News, Arizona local
written by Jacob Luthi
Sunday March 29, 2026

SCOTTSDALE, Arizona - Scottsdale police have identified the body found in a canal as a woman who had been reported missing since March 22 from the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community.

What we know: Passion Schurz, 28, was last seen alive at her home on March 19, but investigators are still determining how she died.

Meanwhile, advocates are asking if a Turquoise Alert could have saved her life.

Leila Woodard with the Missing in America Network says Schurz's family contacted her after she was last seen on March 19, hoping someone had seen the mom.

"This was very unusual," she said. 'She left without her wallet and her purse, which she never did that. And so just the circumstances around her being missing was very concerning."

Woodard says Schurz was deeply loved by her community and that the circumstances surrounding her disappearance remain mysterious.

"She was very loved by her family and community in that she was a mother, you know, and this was very unusual," Woodard said.

Scottsdale police say someone walking along the canal near Indian Bend and Hayden roads around 8 a.m. on March 28 spotted the body and called it in, prompting officers to respond and work to recover the body from the water.

Investigators said they identified Schurz based on tattoos, physical characteristics, and clothing, but what was missing were signs of trauma such as fractures, stab wounds, or gunshot injuries.

Dig deeper: "The family and our advocates tried to work with the police to get a Turquoise Alert, but everyone was told she didn't meet the criteria," Woodward said.

The criteria for a Turquoise Alert include:
  • The person is under 65 years old
  • All resources have been used by a local agency
  • The disappearance is suspicious or unexplained, and not just a runaway
  • The person is in danger
  • Issuing the alert could help safely find them
"Turquoise Alert was intended to help the missing murdered Indigenous peoples crisis in our state and entire North America and whenever it's not utilized, we were really upset," she added.

Why you should care: While the circumstances around Schurz’s death remain unclear, Woodard said it’s crucial for people to be vigilant and report any signs of missing persons.

"The missing and murdered Indigenous person crisis is a really big deal," she said. "Indigenous women and girls, especially, go missing at disproportionate rates. And they're 10 times likely to be found deceased in Arizona. We're No. 2 in the nation for missing people and missing Indigenous people. So we have to kind of band together as a community."

SRPD's Statement:

Salt River Police said they did not consider Schurz's disappearance suspicious, or that she was with anyone dangerous. Based on the evidence, they said her disappearance did not qualify as a Turquoise Alert.

A statement from the department read in part:

"At the time the missing person report was taken, the information available to police did not indicate suspicious circumstances, nor was there any indication that the individual was in danger or in the company of a dangerous person.

Based on the facts known at the time of the initial report, the criteria required for the issuance of a Turquoise Alert were not met.

As with any missing person investigation, law enforcement evaluates each case based on the totality of the circumstances and the information available at the time. If new information emerges that changes the nature of the case, appropriate investigative and notification measures are reassessed accordingly."

USA: The Remains Of 21yo Mom Were Found In A Shallow Grave Near Lake Pleasant, AZ 6 Days After Family Reported Her Missing. 24yo Suspect Premeditated The Murder Before Their First Date.

Arizona’s Family (3TV / CBS 5) published July 13, 2026: Glendale woman found dead after going out with man she met online. According to Glendale police, Jones and Rodolico met on social media and met in person for the first time on the day she disappeared.
ABC15 Arizona published July 13, 2026: Missing Glendale woman found dead near Lake Pleasant, man in custody. Glendale police say a woman who was reported missing earlier this month has been found dead near Lake Pleasant, and a man is in custody in connection with her death.
FOX 10 Phoenix published July 13, 2026: Alleged social media date turns deadly: Missing Arizona woman found near lake. A Glendale homicide investigation is underway after 21-year-old Arianna Jones was found dead in a remote area near Lake Pleasant on July 11, four days after her family reported her missing. Police have arrested 24-year-old Domonic Rodolico and charged him with first-degree murder. Investigators believe the two connected on social media and were on their first in-person date the night she was killed.
***********
ABC15 News, Arizona local
written by Staff
Monday July 13, 2026

GLENDALE, AZ — Glendale police say a woman who was reported missing earlier this month has been found dead near Lake Pleasant, and a man is in custody in connection with her death.

Arianna Jones, 21, was last known to be at her apartment near 59th and Northern avenues. When her family went to check on her, they said they found damage to her front door, and she was not there. Her family has had no contact with her since July 5.

According to police documents, Jones' family was concerned that she had been taken against her will.

Family told officials that a broken cell phone was found in the apartment, her wallet was missing, and her dog was found in a kennel without food or water. Family said routine video calls to her young child, who was staying with family at the time, had stopped, and their messages were no longer being marked as “read,” leading to further concern for her well-being.

A friend told police that she had planned to meet “an acquaintance” for a movie. Evidence shows the man, identified by police as Domonic Rodolico, had picked Jones up from her apartment and never returned.

Police say they used video evidence and vehicle alert systems, and also report that his cell phone's location moved alongside Jones’ phone locations. Investigators determined that her cell phone last pinged near Lake Pleasant early in the morning on July 6.

Police say “extensive” data was analyzed in this case and suggest that Rodolico “went to an extremely remote, secluded and undeveloped location near Lake Pleasant Parkway and W. Old Carefree Highway, with no apparent legitimate reason for being there,” before picking Jones up from her apartment. Data showed Rodolico went to the location three times that day.

On Saturday, July 11, officials located “decomposing human remains in this area along with additional evidence," including movie theater cups and clothes.

Police say the relationship between Jones and Rodolico is still under investigation, but it appears the pair shared a few short phone calls over a few weeks after meeting on social media.

Documents show Rodolico was later seen apparently cleaning out his car, and he appeared to have a bandaged wound on his arm/hand.

Rodolico reportedly told police that he and the victim were approached by unknown men and were “jumped,” but he could not provide additional details. Police say his story continued to change as he was questioned.

“It is apparent, Domonic premeditated this incident and murdered the victim…Domonic was unable to explain himself nor was he willing to, and “did not appear to show any remorse…,” documents state.

The cause of Jones' death is under investigation, as well as a possible motive.


Glendale police confirmed Monday that Rodolico was taken into custody on charges including first-degree murder. Police say he is being held on a $2 million cash bond.

July 12, 2026

HAPPY Sunday Everybody! Sending Some Inspiration Your Way. Get Lifted. 😊

HAPPY Sunday everybody! I woke up singing this song in my spirit. No weapon formed against me shall prosper and every tongue that rises up against me my God in Heaven shall condemn. God is good always! Keep your eyes on Him and the negativity will fall to the wayside. Sending some inspiration your way. Hope you have a fantastic day! SMILE. 😁😘💞

PRAYER:
I receive my divine miracle in the Mighty name of my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. Amen. I believe I receive. I'm marching on in Victory. Thank you Father God. Thank you Lord Jesus. Thank you Holy Spirit. Amen. For Jesus Christ arose with Victory from the dark domain and to live forever with His saints to reign. He Arose! He Arose! Hallelujah Christ Arose! Amen. My soul magnify the Lord and my spirit praise His Holy name. For death could not hold Him captive... even in the grave... Jesus Christ is King of kings and Lord of lords. Amen! Glory be to God in the Highest. Lord of my life and of my strength and of my soul. Amen. Thank you Father God. Blessed be your name forever and ever! Amen. 💞

(Your Love Keeps Lifting Me) Higher and Higher (1967)
~by Jackie Wilson

Your love, liftin' me higher
Than I've ever been lifted before
So keep it up, quench my desire
And I'll be at your side forevermore

You know your love (your love keeps liftin' me)
Keeps on liftin' (your love keeps liftin' me)
Higher (liftin' me, liftin' me), higher, and higher (higher)
I said your love (your love keeps liftin' me)
Keeps on (liftin' me, liftin' me)
Liftin' me (liftin' me) higher and higher (higher)

Now once I was downhearted
Disappointment was my closest friend
But then you came and he soon departed
And you know he never showed his face again

That's why your love (your love keeps liftin' me)
Keeps on liftin' (your love keeps liftin' me)
Higher (liftin' me, liftin' me), higher, and higher (higher)
I said your love (your love keeps liftin' me)
Keeps on (liftin' me, liftin' me)
Liftin' me (liftin' me) higher and higher (higher)
Awww

I'm so glad I finally found you
Yes, that one in a million girls
And I wish my lovin' arms around ya
Honey, I can stand up and face the world

Let me tell ya your love (your love keeps liftin' me)
Keeps on liftin' (your love keeps liftin' me)
Higher (liftin' me, liftin' me), higher, and higher (higher)
I said your love (your love keeps liftin' me)
Keeps on (liftin' me, liftin' me)
Liftin' me (liftin' me) higher and higher (higher)

July 11, 2026

USA: Iconic Primm Resort Casino Operations On The Nevada California Stateline Have Been Rescued From Permanent Closure By Terrible's At The Eleventh Hour. 300 Jobs And Local History Saved.

YAY! :D
8 News Now — Las Vegas published July 6, 2026: Terrible’s keeps 300 jobs as Primm enters new era. For generations, Primm has been one of Southern Nevada’s most recognizable roadside landmarks.
News 3 Las Vegas published July 6, 2026: Primm avoids ghost town fears with Terrible's operation deal.
News 3 Las Vegas published June 29, 2026: Terrible's takes over management of Primm properties beginning July 1. Primm’s last operating casino shut down June 29, 2026, marking another major turning point for the tiny border town after months of uncertainty about whether it could keep its doors open at all. Primm Valley Resort and Casino closed June 29, ending Affinity Gaming’s management of the property ahead of a takeover by Terrible’s. July 1 marks the start of Terrible’s operations in Primm, a change that is expected to keep residents in company-managed apartments and preserve jobs that had been at risk.
Braedyn Beal published April 30, 2026: Why Primm Nevada’s Casino Empire Fell Apart. Located on the edge of the Nevada desert near Las Vegas, Primm, Nevada, was once a thriving casino hub. In this video, we take a deep dive into Primm, Nevada’s casino empire, from its rapid rise as a popular alternative to the busy Vegas strip, to its tearful decline into what many now consider a Primm Nevada ghost town.

At its peak, Primm Valley was home to iconic destinations like Buffalo Bill’s, Whiskey Pete’s Casino, and Primm Valley Resort and Casino, drawing in travelers looking for a classic Nevada casino experience just outside of Las Vegas. From the famous Primm Nevada roller coaster towering over the desert to the once-bustling floors of each Primm Nevada casino, this small town carved out a unique place in the world of Vegas casino culture.

But today, much of Primm Valley casino life has faded, with signs of decline, closures, and leading to an eerie abandoned casino atmosphere. What caused this shift? How did a promising hub of Nevada desert casinos lose its momentum while Las Vegas and the broader Vegas scene continued to grow?

Just a short drive away in nearby Jean, Nevada, lies Terrible’s Hotel & Casino, another example of the smaller Nevada desert casinos that once served as key stops between cities. Like Primm, it reflects how changing travel patterns and the evolution of the Vegas casino industry have impacted these roadside gambling destinations over time. Join us as we explore the full story behind Primm, Nevada, uncovering the factors that led to the downfall of its casino industry and how it became one of the most intriguing abandoned destinations in the Nevada desert.

*********
News3, Las Vegas NV local
written by Steve Wolford
Monday July 6, 2026

LAS VEGAS — Primm, a small oasis community on the California state line, is no longer facing the prospect of becoming a modern-day ghost town after a deal was finalized to shift several local properties to Terrible’s.

Affinity Gaming announced plans in May to close its Primm operations, raising concerns about what would happen to the community and the people who work and live there.

The finalized deal means several properties in Primm, including the Primm Valley Resort and Casino, was transitioned to Terrible’s, easing uncertainty for about 300 employees.

Dominic Jenkins, who works at what was the Primm Center and now works for Terrible’s, said the transition moved quickly once the deal was finalized. “I feel great! We don't have to scramble around and find housing or another job, so.. it's a good feeling,” Jenkins said.

He described how fast changes were made at the store. “We had to wrecking ball this place. We took the aisles down. We ordered stuff. It all came in one day. We did everything in one day,” Jenkins said.

The transition was still underway this afternoon at the market that serves the Desert Oasis Apartments, where Jenkins and hundreds of other Primm employees live. Retail manager Robert Guillen said the focus has been on bringing operations in line with Terrible’s expectations. “Really, just training our staff, getting our store up to standards,” Guillen said.

Guillen said the changeover involved multiple departments and systems, including replacing the computers behind the counter. “We had all of our stakeholders - all hands on deck from marketing, I-T, our operations folks such as myself, h.r. to transition all of the team members,” he said.

UNLV gaming historian David Schwartz said Primm’s decline began with the expansion of tribal gaming in California, but he believes Terrible’s is positioned to reinvent the area, including reopening the casino at Primm Valley Resort and Casino and determining what to do with other acquisitions such as Buffalo Bill’s, home to the “Desperado” rollercoaster, as well as the truck stop and Whiskey Pete’s across the freeway.

“I think a lot of it's looking beyond what's happened in the past,” Schwartz said.

Schwartz said the outcome will depend on how Terrible’s markets the destination and what it offers visitors. “I think a lot of it does depend on how they market it and what attractions they have there; people will travel to go to things,” he said. He added, “If it's just, well, here's the same slot machines you can play an hour closer to home, maybe not, but if it's, well, here's something different, maybe.”

Terrible’s also now owns the lotto store in Primm, a point local radio host Ryan Hunter of the “Road Show” on Coyote Country FM called important for the community’s future. “I think it's awesome they saved it. But here's what I want Vegas to know. We have to come here and support it now,” Hunter said. “If Terrible's is going to save it and the jobs, we have to do our part,” he said.